



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

life and other vital processes is the foundation upon which alone a symmetrical superstructure can be built; and the sooner this can be impressed upon the beginning student the better for him and for the future of science.

The naïve mind has no interest in an "object" apart from its place in the general scheme of things. He asks, What is it for? How does it work? Science has at last caught up with this childlike attitude. By long and painful labor of many centuries we have come to see that purely descriptive studies are not science. We do not in science study bodies apart from their functions, nor disembodied functions. If psychology is to maintain its place among the sciences, it must not isolate itself from the rest of natural process by limiting its interest to pure introspection or to purely objective behavior.¹¹

C. JUDSON HERRICK.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

GREGARIOUSNESS AND THE IMPULSE TO CLASSIFY

WHAT I take to be one of the psychical expressions of that trait so marked in simian species, gregariousness, has recently been termed in ethnological circles the sense of participation, the feeling of being oneself related to what comes into consciousness. This mystical feeling is accompanied, we know, by ideas and impulses which give rise to many forms of conduct and many trains of theory. Magic and religion have hitherto yielded us the most obvious¹ and abundant illustrations of this aspect of mentality. Take the theory and practises of magical contagion, or in religion, the belief in possession and its ritual. For the moment, however, I would indicate how the sense of participation manifests itself in that part of the social organization we sometimes call status, the social categories.

These social categories may be summed up as the categories of age, sex, kin, caste, place-fellowship, friendship. Within the groups which this social differentiation establishes the gregarious instinct is concentrated, to them the sense of participation attaches, around them institutional life revolves, and into them every individual in so far as he is a member of society must fit. Anomalies do, of course, occur, but they are considered unsocial or anti-social,—nuisances or laughing-stocks, perverts, criminals, illegitimates, traitors.

¹¹ Since writing these lines my attention has been called to Professor Angell's very judicious analysis of this problem, "Behavior as a Category in Psychology," *Psych. Rev.*, Vol. XX., pages 255-270.

¹ The most obvious, because in supernaturalism we have secured a certain degree of that detachment or immunity from the sense of participation which makes rationalism possible.

But social conformity is not the only achievement of the social categories. They are ambitious, nay, greedy. They spread out over quite irrelevant matters, invading regions remote and, one might suppose, recondite. To almost everything sex is imputed—to sun and moon and earth and all things of the earth, animate or inanimate. For the Chinaman nature is divided into two great parts, *yang*, the male principle, embracing light, warmth, life, and *yin*, the female principle, embracing darkness, cold, death. To the Hopi Indian, North, South, and the Above are male; West, East, and the Below, female. In cosmologies seniority is also recognized. The soul of the world was made before the body, asserts Plato's spokesman Timaeus, for never would God have allowed the elder to serve the younger. That "women and other animals were framed from men" Timaeus has no doubt. Nor was it a mere accident that Adam was created before Eve. Caste makes claims, too, without the help of seniority. The head is the lord of the body, says the Greek, and because the front part of the body is more honorable than the back man was given by his creator a forward motion. In blood kinship the heavenly bodies are related, men and animals, species with species. Sun and moon are brother and sister, this species or that are the ancestors of tribe or clan, or its brethren. As for the provinces of language, art, and economy, not alone are they districted out among the differentiated social groups, each province is in itself subject to the societary classification—there is gender, for example, in language; manual labor has less social prestige than mental, art more than handicraft.

In brief, the habit of classifying along the lines the social group has differentiated itself the better to satisfy its own gregarious impulse, this habit recognizes in early cultures few barriers. The social categories color the whole of life. They tend to bring everything into relation with themselves, into their own bounds. Nor are they merely possessive; from their compulsive, imperious character rather are they obsessive.

Given the impulse to classify, the novel, the unclassifiable is disturbing, fearful. Here, may I suggest, is the origin of *mana*, the power imputed by the primitive mind to the mysterious. Fear of *mana*, fear of the unknown, is the feeling aroused by the unclassified, the feeling that the gregarious instinct has been frustrated.

In self-protection, men feel, *mana* must be given a place. Out of the endeavor to classify *mana*, to know it, out of curiosity about *mana*, as it were, arises magic, arises religion. The gods made in the likeness of man are man's successful attempts to categorize *mana*, the fearful unknown. In pantheons like the Greek or the Germanic or the Catholic Christian the classification is carried far—the categories

of sex, seniority, kinship, caste, place-fellowship, and even friendship, the junior category, all are at work.

Religions perish, fear of *mana* is more and more circumscribed, the specific classifications primitive man has made for nature are rejected, even the classifications he has made for himself, for society, are questioned, but the impulse to classify persists; it is the impetus left over, so to speak, from his first impulse for social classification, his earliest attempts to satisfy his gregarious instinct. Out of that instinct develop, we may say, not only scientific methods, but scientific curiosity and the will for scientific research. Science is a fruit of gregariousness.

In conclusion let me ask behaviorists if gregariousness among animals shows any relation to curiosity or to fear of the strange or novel? Are the more gregarious creatures the more curious? Are they more fearful of the unexpected or less? Or, put better, perhaps, are animals less fearful and more curious when they are together?

ELSIE CLEWS PARSONS.

NEW YORK CITY.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Man of Genius. HERMANN TÜRCK. London: Adam and Charles Black. 1914. Pp. 463.

Among the new insights into the German mind with which we have been favored this past year, not the least interesting has been the discovery of a certain contemptuous tolerance of morals as a set of rules and principles having jurisdiction only in the secondary affairs of life. It would seem that many Germans of education mean by morality merely the approved, but not rationally obligatory, customs of society. This appears to be Dr. Türck's view; for he says, for example, "Goethe is undoubtedly right when he says that 'the man who acts is always devoid of conscience.'" Yet, curiously enough, much the greater part of the author's book is distinctly ethical; and it is in that field that its chief, if not its sole, excellences are found.

There are, indeed, metaphysical sections; but they are quite uncritical, and rather hamper than further the argument of the book. It seems to be assumed that no enlightened reader will be Philistine enough to challenge the world-transcending Hindu and Neo-Platonic monism, while Spinoza is quoted with something like the naïve reverence of a medieval Thomist citing the Stagirite. Let the following extract—which might well be a modern epitome of one of the Enneads, and which is supported by no argument whatever—serve as a sample:

"God has divided Himself into an infinite number of creatures. He has descended from His infinite greatness, freedom, and perfection, and now lives in a humble form in the atom, in the worm, in man. Yet the